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Cet article s’intéresse à la confiance du public dans la police et à la
manière de la renforcer ou de l’affaiblir. L’étude compare les réponses des
autorités de Londres et de Berlin aux plaintes relatives à des fautes profes-
sionnelles policières entre 1880 et 1914. De quelle manière la police londo-
nienne s’y prit-elle pour conserver sa bonne réputation et un haut niveau de
confiance auprès du public, en dépit de la fréquence avérée de fautes profes-
sionnelles? L’analyse permet de repérer un certain nombre de facteurs qui,
dans le traitement des plaintes, contribuèrent à restaurer, voire dans certains
cas à renforcer la confiance du public dans la Metropolitan Police. Par
contraste, le cas berlinois montre comment l’insensibilité et le dédain pour
les préoccupations légitimes du public face à l’inconduite policière minèrent
les efforts pour renforcer la confiance de ce dernier dans la police. De sorte
que la Schutzmannshaft se trouva beaucoup plus vulnérable que la Metropo-
litan Police aux efforts des critiques et de la presse pour susciter l’indigna-
tion du public et produire des «scandales policiers» dans leurs propres inté-
rêts politiques et commerciaux.
This article is about public trust in the police, how to maintain it and how
to challenge it. The study compares responses by police and government
authorities in London and Berlin to complaints over police malpractice from
the 1880s to 1914. How did the London Metropolitan police manage to main-
tain a good reputation and high levels of public trust despite ample evidence
of widespread police malpractice? The analysis identifies a number of factors
in the handling of complaints and responses to allegations of malpractice
that helped to re-establish and sometimes strengthen trust in the Metropoli-
tan police. By contrast, the case of Berlin shows how insensitive and dismis-
sive reactions to legitimate public concerns over police malpractice under-
mined attempts to improve public confidence in the police. This made the
Schutzmannschaft far more vulnerable than the London Metropolitan police
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for the critics and the press to generate public outrage and construct “police
scandals” for their own political and commercial ends.
POLICE-PUBLIC RELATIONS:
FROM MISHAPS TO SCANDAL
In July 1887, while the London press and Parliament were challenging theMetropolitan Police over the controversial arrest of a young seamstress, Eliza-
beth Cass, on charges of soliciting, further concerns about police malpractice were
raised in Parliament by William S. Caine MP. He alleged that police constables took
bribes from the prostitutes who conducted their business on Clapham Common.
Given the high profile of the complainant, Under-Secretary Munro from the Home
Office visited Caine at home, and subsequently wrote a fourteen-pages report
explaining how he had urged Caine to substantiate his allegations with solid evi-
dence. As Caine could present nothing more than the testimony of the prostitutes
themselves, the report concluded that the allegations were pure fantasy based on
Caine’s naïve trust in the basest of females. While Munro described his own conduct
at the meeting as measured, polite and professional, Caine comes across as a bab-
bling idiot. Later that year, when the barrister Bradford Woodgate raised similar
concerns in a complaints letter to Chief Commissioner Charles Warren, the proce-
dures and outcome were very much the same2. The authorities investigated, wrote
reports and then concluded that there was no case to answer.
The police authorities in Berlin approached complaints very differently. In 1883,
shortly after the formalisation of police complaints procedures in the Prussian
Landesverwaltungsgesetz3, a Berlin lawyer, Rechtsanwalt Kaufmann, from the
Association for Legal Defence and Judicial Reform (Verein für Rechtschutz und
Justizreform) presented a petition to the Prussian Diet complaining about serious
malpracticewithin the Berlin Schutzmannschaft. The petition was seized by the
press who presented the horrifying details of the allegations to the German public
who were suitably appalled. During the spring of 1884 the petition was discussed at
length by the Interior Ministry and the Provincial Governors, who were indeed very
keen to address the problem of police malpractice. Yet the press was never informed,
and the public could only guess at whatever actions or discussions were taking place
within the civil service. In a typical comparison with English policing, a commenta-
tor in the liberal VossischeZeitung noted on 16 May 1884 that this form of secrecy
did nothing to improve trust in the Prussian police4.
The image of the “gentle English Bobby” has suffered some serious blows over
the past decades as social historians have cast unflattering light on both the men and
the institutions5. Yet, despite important revisions of the positive myths, the Victorian
Bobby undoubtedly enjoyed a much better reputation among contemporaries than
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his European and North American counterparts6. The Berlin Schutzmannschaft in
particular suffered from a poor reputation right from its inception in 1848: German
police reformers continuously compared the rude, bossy and boundlessly violent
Schutzmann7 with the English Bobby, who was held up as the standard for good pro-
fessional conduct8. However, the Prussian authorities did try to address the problem,
and the reputation of the Schutzmannschaft was sometimes worse than deserved.
Since the 1980s historians of German policing have sought to moderate and contex-
tualise the image of the Schutzmann, linking the aggressiveness of Prussian
Schutzmänner to structural problems such as understaffing, poor professional train-
ing and the difficulties of imposing authority on a reluctant population9.
These reassessments of the “gentleness” of the Bobby and the “aggressiveness”
of the Berlin Schutzmann present the historians with an interesting problem: how
was it possible for the London Metropolitan police to maintain an image of Bobbies
as well behaved, honest and moderate in their use of force, despite repeated evi-
dence of questionable practices, including violence, perjury, disregard for legality
and due process, as well as persistent rumours of corruption10? The Berlin Schutz-
mannschaft provides a useful counter-example of unsuccessful attempts to improve
the image of the Schutzmann even among natural supporters of law and order.
As policing is by its very nature confrontational and often controversial, good
public relations are difficult to build up and public trust is easily lost. The persis-
tence of the positive image of the Bobby therefore requires some explanation. Con-
temporary observers and historians have linked the widespread public acceptance of
the Bobby11, and the universal fear and loathing of the Schutzmann12 to differences
in the legal and institutional framework. Similarly much has been made of the mili-
tary background and ethos of Schutzmänner as opposed to the civilian ethos of the
Metropolitan police. This article adds a further dimension to these explanations by
analysing how public expectations and trust were influenced by the handling of
criticism by police managers and government authorities.
The article investigates trust-building mechanisms in London and Berlin, and
compares the moral economy of scandal within the two political cultures between
1880 and 1914. It argues that in London the rhetoric of the Metropolitan police
helped to strengthen the image of a responsive, disciplined and accountable force,
despite a reality of highly ineffective accountability mechanisms, strongly biased
against complainants. In Berlin the official rhetoric from police and government
authorities, together with the complaints procedures and judicial proceedings often
had the unintended effect of undermining public confidence in complaints and
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accountability mechanisms. This left the Berlin Schutzmannschaft far more vulner-
able than the London Metropolitan to public criticism, with incidents of police
misbehaviour easily being presented as a ’scandal’ by the left-liberal and social
democratic press as a device to undermine the legitimacy of political opponents13.
Recent literature on the dynamics and political function of scandal has observed
that the effective use of the moral economy of scandal requires an astute under-
standing of ever-changing popular conceptions of what constitutes transgressive
behaviour and of what rhetoric is acceptable within particular discourses14. It
appears that the scope for mobilising public indignation and the scale of public
outcry is only partly correlated to the seriousness of the transgression. Moreover,
certain factors tend to desensitise the public and work against the mobilisation of
public consternation. Even gross errors or mishaps by police are often tolerated if
committed under difficult circumstances, such as public order policing, armed
stand-offs, or violations due to mistaken identity or to the under-resourcing of the
police, particularly if such problems could only be addressed by citizens paying
more for policing. Similarly when transgressive behaviour happens frequently and
conspicuously, the public tends to adopt an attitude of apathy or cynicism. As
Eugene Weber rightly observed in relation to political scandals in Republican
France of the 1880s-1890s: where scandals and crises happen frequently, public
opinion ceases to take notice of ’minor’ errors15.
The police behaviour that generates “scandal” tends to develop in two stages.
There is the initial transgression: a deliberate act committed out of corruption, cal-
lousness or malice which arouses indignation in proportion to the scale and nature
of the offence. Yet usually the transgression only has the potential to develop into a
“scandal” if the responsible police managers and government authorities seem
unwilling or unable to rectify the offence.
What distinguished London from Berlin was the engagement by British author-
ities in debates over the boundaries around legitimate policing (deontology), which
modern scholars have identified as central to popular acceptance of policing16.
Another key element in public confidence was that the London Metropolitan police
made an effort to appear trustworthy. In London, the police rhetoric and strategic
approaches to criticism thereby reassured large parts of the public that allegations of
malpractice were properly investigated and effectively disciplined. As long as
accountability and control mechanisms appeared credible, the occasional revelation
of malpractice, if skilfully handled, might even strengthen police legitimacy and
public trust, particularly among those who had few dealings with the police.
Accordingly, Londoners tended to give the police the benefit of the doubt, and con-
tinued to see police corruption and violence as an aberration from the norm.
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The public outrage in Berlin was caused not simply by poor professional conduct
by Schutzmänner. The failure by senior officials to respond adequately to legitimate
public concerns was central to the escalation of widespread consternation. Inconsis-
tent rhetoric, insensitive and fanciful justifications of serious police malpractice, as
well as institutionalised defence mechanisms continuously undermined attempts to
improve the relationship between police and public. The Berlin Schutzmannschaft
never managed to overcome deep-seated public distrust of the police: a burdensome
legacy inherited by the Schupo of the Weimar Republic.
BUILDING TRUST
AND CONSTRUCTING LEGITIMACY IN LONDON:
POLICE RHETORIC AND STRATEGIES
Inevitably the London Metropolitan police had its fair share of public complaints
and popular outcry over alleged police malpractice. In London as in Berlin, com-
plaints came from citizens with very limited social capital as well as from influen-
tial members of the public, and covered a very broad range of issues, from com-
plaints about police incivility or harassment, incompetence or drunkenness, to very
serious allegations of corruption or violence17. Public concerns over malpractice
within the London Met culminated in 1906 with allegations of widespread corrup-
tion, leading to a major public inquiry by the Royal Commission into the Duties of
the Metropolitan Police. Its report from August 1908 comprised hundreds of pages
of witness statements, perspectives on practices since the 1880s, figures and recom-
mendations. It revealed not only dubious or outright illegal practices, but also
inadequate accountability and complaints mechanisms18. Nevertheless, the British
press overwhelmingly accepted the official conclusions that problems were
marginal and concentrated on a few individual constables. Overall the Metropolitan
police was officially confirmed as a force of good, honest and hardworking men.
Control and accountability mechanisms were described as functioning satisfactorily,
albeit with some scope for improvement19. Some criticism was raised at the margins
of the public debate, but such critics remained lone voices. During the same decade
the Berlin Schutzmannschaft became the object of repeated public revelations of
violent practices, corruption and above all wilful disregard by senior police and
government authorities for the malpractices committed by the force, individually
and collectively. The public outcry came not only from the usual suspects of Social
Democrats and the Left-Liberal opposition, but also included important sections of
the well-established bourgeoisie.
One key feature in the construction of trust and legitimacy in London was the
consistency between internal police instructions and orders, public declarations and
the rhetoric relating to accountability mechanisms: police managers appeared to
practise what they preached. Together the official rhetoric, complaints procedures,
and the courts formed a coherent set of arguments, mutually sustaining the legiti-
macy of each other. As the London Metropolitan police after 1829 continuously had
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to justify its existence20, the rhetoric and procedures were intended to reassure
potential opponents and nervous rate-payers that the police were there to serve and
protect them21, and that the police would approach them with politeness, enforce the
law with discretion and proportionality, and operate strictly within the boundaries of
the law22. The impression was projected to the propertied middle-classes that con-
stables could be controlled and disciplined much in the same way as domestic ser-
vants. By the 1880s these control and accountability mechanisms had become tools
in on-going exercises in damage limitation, reparation and strengthening of police
legitimacy.
However the elegant public rhetoric concealed limited implementation of such
mechanisms. Metropolitan police managers sought to protect their men against crit-
icism, in the attempt to balance the need for effective – albeit dubious – policing
practices against potential damage to public trust in the police. Police managers
could not afford to admit publicly that constables often did not meet minimum pro-
fessional standards or that police sometimes operated outside the legal framework,
particularly not if the alleged transgression was not a “one off,” but standard prac-
tice. As Gamon points out, many policing practices of dubious legality were tacitly
ignored by the management as long as this was not revealed in public23. The major-
ity of allegations against the police were refuted and contained before they attracted
major media attention; it was only very occasionally that a case developed into such
a calamity that the Chief Commissioner or the Home Secretary would have to make
a public statement about it.
Erring police constables could only be supported if a credible case could be
made that the allegations were unsubstantiated or malicious. Credibility was crucial.
London police managers carefully tried to distance themselves from actions which
were likely to generate outrage in the wider public. Police managers therefore
needed to assess in each case whether the policeman’s version of event could be
spun in a way that was both credible and morally acceptable to the wider public. Jus-
tifying embarrassing events through extravagant explanations or stubborn denials in
the face of “much evidence to the contrary” might cause more harm to public trust
than the case was worth.
While critics complained that police constables in court developed fanciful
explanations to justify serious injuries inflicted on members of the public24, the public
declarations of police managers were more sophisticated. They tended to follow one
of two strategies depending on the ‘defensibility’ of the case: one was to join the
public in condemning certain actions as unacceptable and outrageous, but maintain
that the accused policeman had not acted as alleged. This allowed police managers
to position themselves on the moral high ground over the question of the ethical
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boundaries of legitimate policing, and to move the discussion to the question of
‘what actually happened.’ The incident could then be defended on the basis of the
policeman’s version of events, which was almost invariably cast in terms that made
it appear legitimate and moderate. If the complainant could show evidence of seri-
ous bodily harm, the police authorities tended to down-play the seriousness of the
injuries and give a plausible explanation as to how the person had been hurt in ways
that did not involve the police.
In cases where evidence of police malpractice was too manifest to support any
credible denial, a slightly different strategy was employed. Again, police managers
would join the public outrage, showing that they were in full agreement with public
opinion about the boundaries of ethically acceptable policing. Then they would
announce further police investigations and publicly commit themselves to discipline
any offending officer, if allegations were substantiated. The authorities would then
carefully control and shape any investigation. During the Royal Commission of
1906-1908 the very restricted remit imposed by the Home Office reduced the num-
ber of cases investigated from over 300 to twelve25. Despite vigorous objections
from critics26, the commission and its procedures still appeared credible to the wider
public who did not follow the details of the inquiry.
If allegations were refuted by internal or external investigations and whenever
an accused constable was acquitted by the courts, this would be used in the police
rhetoric as testimony, not only to the honesty of the individual policeman, but
as proof of the high moral standards and discipline of the entire force. Similarly,
every time a constable was acquitted by the courts, senior police authorities strongly
insinuated that almost all allegations of malpractice against the Metropolitan police
were generated by a few malicious individuals. On the other hand, a guilty verdict
against a policeman was presented to the public as evidence of the robustness and
effectiveness of control and accountability mechanism as well as testimony to the
transparency and self-scrutiny of the police27. Malpractice was always described as
individual error, whereby police managers limited the risk of further scrutiny into
standard policing practices. The implicit message was: “We have discovered a
problem; we have dealt with it ; we have moved forward.” Accordingly, both
convictions and acquittals were systematically presented to the public in ways that
made the police organisation and its accountability procedures appear transparent
and effective. Overall it strengthened the impression in the public of the police being
responsive, transparent, and trustworthy.
This shiny image of policing practices was belied by numerous memoirs published
throughout the period by retired police constables or inspectors, who candidly
revealed systematic malpractice within different sections of the force. Yet such
revelations of malpractice would most often be presented by the authors as the practices
of days long gone, with reassuring claims that policing practices now conformed to
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the law and that the professional standards of constables had improved28. As in the
case of the occasional conviction of constables, the scandals of corruption and vio-
lence that haunted the Metropolitan police – such as the 1877 scandals in the Detec-
tive Department, or the allegations of malpractice investigated by the Royal Com-
mission of 1906-1908, or the Goddard corruption case of 1929 – were presented to
the reading public as testimony to the effectiveness of internal control mecha-
nisms29. The underlying message in police memoirs thereby supported the official
rhetoric : all projected the image of the rank-and-file constables as honest, moderate
and disciplined, with high professional standards and integrity. As for the police
management, they appeared to the public as responsive, respectful of the law, moderate
in their methods, and willing to investigate and discipline erring constables.
The importance of this image can be discerned through the damage caused to
police-public relations during the tenure of Chief Commissioner Charles Warren.
Unfortunately his tenure coincided with the turbulent years of 1886-1888, which
required a man of flexibility, and engagement with public criticism. Instead War-
ren’s intransigent and insensitive handling of legitimate concerns about police
violence, alleged corruption and abuse of power caused considerable damage to the
public image of the Metropolitan police. It was left to his successor, James Munro,
to re-establish good public relations and restore trust in the police.
As public opinion became more sensitive to police malpractice during the late
19th century, the London Metropolitan police had developed ways of responding to
criticism that were geared towards reassuring the public. Together these strategies
constituted what – in relation to strategies of protests policing – has been described
as “winning by appearing to lose”30. The occasional transgression by London Bob-
bies could therefore result in what Gerrard describes as a ‘cleansing effect’ on the
system31. Even the fact that the popular press was full of allegations of police mal-
practice occasionally received positive spin as proof of how transparent and open to
criticism English policing was32.
Investigations and court procedures thereby carried the potential for restoring
the relationship between police and public at two levels : it provided justice to the
injured individual, and at the same time reassured the wider public that discipline as
well as control and accountability measures were robust and effective. This worked
in London because in the eyes of large sections of the public the police authorities
appeared credible and honest, and the judicial measures appeared fair, impartial and
transparent.
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POLITELY ACTING WITH ”MERCILESS ENERGY”:
THE INCONSISTENCIES
OF POLICE RHETORIC IN BERLIN
The widespread popular mistrust of the Berlin Schutzmannschaft was obviously
linked to their proverbial rudeness and violence. Yet the comparison with the
London Metropolitan police throws light on less conspicuous factors which exacer-
bated the negative popular expectations. The British approach of “winning by
appearing to lose” was anathema to Prussian authorities, who tended to maintain at
all costs an impenetrable public façade and refused to recognise fault. Prussian
authorities, in their pursuit of the interests of the State, continued to brush off any
challenge to their authority, in particular over policing issues.
Yet from the 1880s police managers and government authorities began to adopt
a more conciliatory tone when addressing the public on uncontroversial matters,
alongside the traditional secretive and defensive gut reactions. This led to police
rhetoric appearing fragmented and pointing in different directions. Official declara-
tions vacillated between reassuring noises and the traditional refusal to engage with
public concerns: paternalistically tough but fair, responsive and caring, but in the
next instant indiscriminately threatening the most extreme measures against anyone
who did not instantly comply with police instructions.
The question of police discipline and accountability had always been a highly
sensitive issue. During the second half of the 19th century Prussian authorities
grudgingly but gradually came to accept the principle that police needed to operate
within the limits of the law. Thus police managers repeatedly emphasised that
Schutzmänner were liable to criminal prosecution if they overstepped their legal
powers33. Yet such guarantees only provided very limited protection against ques-
tionable policing practices. Conservative forces within the Schutzmannschaft con-
tinued to challenge the principle of the Rechtsstaat, maintaining that the police
needed free hands to combat crime and social disorder effectively. Furthermore,
even when Schutzmänner operated strictly within the boundaries of their legal enti-
tlement, there was still plenty of scope for behaviour and practices which might not
be illegal but which violated popular perceptions of what was acceptable. Finally
police managers tended categorically to reject any allegation of error or malpractice,
and to conceive of criticism as malicious attacks on the honour and moral integrity,
not just of the police, but of the entire Prussian State.
In the short term this helped to refute irritating opposition, but it also made the
Schutzmannschaft very vulnerable when evidence of serious malpractice was
revealed. Although the Prussian civil servants generally enjoyed a well-deserved
reputation for honesty and integrity, the Schutzmannschaft had been repeatedly shat-
tered by revelations of serious corruption at the most senior level34. The attempts in
the early 1860s by police managers to deny and cover up serious financial irregular-
ities did much damage to the credibility of the force as the Berlin public was
extremely sensitive to corruption. During the 1880s and 1890s greater public sensi-
tivity to violence led to repeated outrage in the press, starting with Kaufmann’s 1883
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Petition to the Prussian Diet35. Increasingly Berliners and parliamentarians across
the political spectrum complained about the violation of their sense of justice
(Rechtsbewusstsein)36, even when the police had technically acted within the bound-
aries of their legal entitlement.
The responses from successive interior ministers did little to reassure the public.
Between 1898 and 1910 there were several major debates in the Prussian Diet and
the Reichstag concerning police malpractice. Successive Prussian interior ministers
and police presidents, who were caught in the unenviable position of having to
defend rather nasty incidents of police violence37, publicly demonstrated their
unwillingness to allow transparency and meaningful investigations of serious cases.
While Interior Minister von der Recke in 1898 vividly regretted that unfortunate
incidents of police brutality had taken place, he made no commitment to investigate
and discipline erring Schutzmänner; nor did he make any proposition for limiting
the occurrence of serious police brutality against members of the public. Instead, he
declared that such incidents were inevitable38. Twelve years later, in the face of
major public consternation over heavy-handed police interventions in Treptower
Park and the Tiergarten, the reactions from Interior Minister Delbrück were much
the same. He admitted that considerable violence had taken place, but insisted that
the disproportionate and indiscriminate violence was fully justified by the goal the
police had pursued. The message to the public was that an illegal social democratic
gathering justified extreme police intervention leading to significant numbers of
innocent bystanders being severely injured. His insistence that the police had
operated technically within the boundaries of the law39 inevitably raised the question
whether the public got any protection from the law.
This did nothing to reassure or satisfy the public. If the police were not legally in
the wrong, they had nevertheless transgressed the limits of what, by 1910, was
widely understood as morally acceptable. The Social Democratic and Liberal press
mocked the official justifications by describing Delbrück and Police President von
Jagow as “aware of their guilt” (Schuldbewusstsein) and feeling “painfully embar-
rassed” (peinlichVerlegenheit)40. If indeed Police President von Jagow felt painfully
embarrassed about the police intervention in Treptow Park and the Tiergarten, he
concealed his Schuldbewustsein very well. His public statements over this debacle
and similar incidents of heavy-handed police interventions only added insult to
injury, and were reported with consternation by the German press across the politi-
cal spectrum41. Rather than appeasing public opinion, his stubborn defence of what
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41 On 14 February 1910 the conservative Kreuz-Zeitung published the following warning: “Es wird
das Recht auf die Straße verkündet. Die Straße dient lediglich dem Verkehr. Bei Widerstand gegen
die Staatsgewalt erfolgt Waffengebrauch. Ich warneNeugierige.” Similar statements about preemp-
mainstream public opinion regarded as indefensible came across as outrageous and
insensitive. Berliners could hardly be under any illusion that the formal complaints
procedures and legal subjection of the Schutzmannschaft to the law did not ensure
meaningful protection of citizens. Instead, the official justifications of the police’s
right to use extreme violence created the impression that extremely violent policing
was the norm.
It was in vain that more level-headed police managers tried to convince the pub-
lic that the Schutzmannschaft in general acted with moderation and tact. Too many
Berliners had witnessed extremely heavy-handed police interventions for such
claims to appear credible. The suggestion that the Schutzmannschaft did not operate
with undue violence were met with incredulity – even when it might actually have
been true. Public trust in the police and government authorities telling the truth on
such matters remained low even among those who otherwise supported law and
order and were unfailingly loyal to the regime.
Throughout the Wilhelmine era, the authorities in Berlin sought to promote
greater popular acceptance of policing in order to facilitate effective law enforce-
ment42. Indeed senior civil servants were keenly aware and concerned about the
detrimental effect that police malpractice had on the reputation of the Schutz-
mannschaft among citizens irrespective of political inclinations. One handwritten
comment in the margins of a critical article from the liberal Vossische Zeitung bit-
terly stated that poor police behaviour swelled the ranks of the Social Democratic
Party43. Consequently, several initiatives were taken to raise the standards of police
behaviour and to discipline erring officers. Unfortunately such initiatives were
rarely known beyond the inner circles of police managers and senior civil servants ;
when occasionally information was leaked to the press it was presented to the public
as proof of the official cover-up rather than testimony to the attempts by senior
authorities to address the problem44.
The institutional charm-offensive of the Schutzmannschaft failed to generate
‘English’ levels of acceptability, respect and popular trust, because any level of crit-
icism was met with categorical rejection. The non-engagement with legitimate pop-
ular concerns had unfortunate and unintended consequences: it gave the impression
that the police were hiding some dark secrets45, even in cases where the police might
not have been at fault. The lack of transparency, the blatant lies, and the stubborn
defence of indiscriminate and extreme violence undermined trust, even among nat-
ural supporters of the police. It made the Schutzmannschaft appear even more reck-
less and unaccountable than they really were. Whatever improvement was made in
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pursuing erring Schutzmänner, the public would not know about it and it would not
contribute to an improvement in public trust.
THE HANDLING OF CITIZENS’ COMPLAINTS:
PUBLIC TRUST OR DISTRUST
IN THE COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES
The public rhetoric of police and government authorities implicitly reflected
what the authorities considered acceptable or unacceptable police behaviour. For
their part, individual citizens, by complaining about police behaviour, marked out
certain limits as to what they were willing to accept as legitimate or appropriate.
While both the English and the Prussians developed police complaints procedures,
it is worth noting the differences in approach and justifications for allowing citizens
to voice their dissatisfaction.
The complaints procedures for the London Metropolitan police appeared a con-
crete manifestation of the commitment to engage with the concerns of the public46.
It was intended as a mechanism for the de-escalation of potential conflict. Rather
than determining rights or wrongs, it was a negotiation about what was reasonable
and appropriate in particular situations; a discussion about good practice and bound-
aries. The complaints system was undoubtedly designed primarily to meet the con-
cerns of the middle-class rate payers, rather than being a means of addressing the
complaints of the poor and marginal. Yet the police rhetoric claimed that the system
was impartial, thorough and fair, irrespective of the social position of the com-
plainant. The system did indeed allow for some flexibility and sensitivity in its han-
dling of complaints from people with limited resources. There was even a small
fund set aside for compensation, although it appears to have been used very rarely47.
Access to make a complaint was deliberately broad and flexible: complaints
could be made in writing to the Chief Commissioner, or to senior police officers at
lower levels in writing, or by personal appointment. In terms of public relations this
provided a forum for informal settlements of conflict and dissatisfaction. From a
managerial point of view, it also provided police managers with information from
outside the police hierarchy about how individual policemen were performing and
what kinds of problem existed between the Bobbies and local communities. Yet, in
practice many of those who sought to raise awareness about poor police behaviour
found themselves confronted with stiff opposition from the side of the police
authorities, and subjected to intense pressure from the police to withdraw their
allegations. Investigations relied heavily on police statements and tended to give
much greater credit to accounts by constables than to those of members of the
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public. Not surprisingly many complaints ended with withdrawal or, at most,
preliminary police investigations concluding that no error had been detected on the
part of the police. However, the Metropolitan authorities were careful to treat com-
plainants with courtesy – at least complainants of ‘respectable’ appearance – and to
give the impression that investigations were thorough, transparent and even-handed.
Only if the complaints procedure appeared credible could it fulfil the purpose of
strengthening legitimacy and public acceptance.
By contrast, it was hardly concerns for legitimacy and widespread popular
acceptance that motivated the formalisation of police complaints procedures in
Prussia in 1883. Prussian authorities did nothing to publicise the intricate rules for
making a ‘correct’ complaint ; in fact, it would require a legal specialist to identify
the exact procedures, buried in the finer details of the Landesverwaltungsgesetz48.
Moreover the Prussian complaints procedures were conceived in very rigid legalis-
tic terms, which were ill-suited to negotiate disagreements about boundaries of
appropriate policing. It did not help that “error” was conceived only as transgression
of some law or instruction. Moreover, unlike the London Metropolitan police,
German policing did not operate with the concept of acting with proportionality49.
Any amount of police force was regarded as legitimate in order to enforce laws and
regulations.
The restrictive rules as defined in 1883 may have been constructed with the aim
of limiting complaints to the “bessere Stände”; however, by the 1890s it was clear
that any attempt to restrict complainants to respectable middle-class citizens had
failed. An increasing number of people complained, not least because the Social
Democratic Rechtsbureaux busied themselves with informing people about their
legal rights and how go about the legal system50. Only during the 1890s did the
police authorities began to consider the complaints procedures in more constructive
terms as part of improving public relations. In 1898 the Interior Minister even
encouraged people to use the complaints system instead of venting their grievances
in the press51. Complaints procedures had the double advantage of making the
Schutzmannschaft appear open and modern, while allowing embarrassing revela-
tions to be dealt with through internal investigations rather than under the glaring
eyes of the public. Moreover, police authorities in Berlin – no less than their London
counterparts – became aware of certain managerial advantages. Complaints pro-
vided the Berlin police president with useful information about the poor perfor-
mance of individual Schutzmänner and units, by-passing the police hierarchy52.
As a mechanism for generating public trust, however, the Prussian complaints
procedures were largely unsuccessful. To the police authorities it was of no concern
whether the investigation appeared transparent or satisfied the complainant that his
or her complaints had been handled in a thorough and impartial manner. Among the
considerable number of complaints that were investigated the outcome was in most
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cases predictably negative53. The investigation primarily consisted of asking the
police unit in question to make statements, and only in a minority of cases were
statements taken by the complainant and independent witnesses. The complainant
would receive a short letter explaining that “after thorough investigation” the police
president found that the Schutzmann in question had acted “correctly” and had no
case to answer. The complainant would receive no information about how this deci-
sion was reached and on the basis of which evidence.
The Prussian complaints procedures – just like the police rhetoric – came across
as inconsistent and pointing in different direction. The rigid handling of complaints
was not simply a missed opportunity for strengthening public trust ; instead of
becoming a forum for mediating small scale conflict with the public, the complaints
procedures frustrated hundreds of individual complainants. Unfortunately it con-
firmed the impression of the police as arrogant, secretive and refusing any mean-
ingful engagement with citizens’ legitimate concerns and grievances.
PUBLIC TRUST IN THE COURTS:
ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY AND IMPARTIALITY
During the second half of the 19th century, in Prussia as in England, account-
ability to the law became a cornerstone in the legitimisation of police actions. Yet in
both countries critics complained that the courts did not provide effective control of
transgressive police actions, and that victims of police violence and perjury were
unlikely to get a fair and impartial hearing. The information on criminal proceedings
against policemen is patchy and difficult to compare. Yet some features emerge to
help contextualise the difficulties confronting aggrieved citizens.
London police and government authorities frequently reminded the public that
the Metropolitan Police operated with greater moderation than foreign forces, and
ordered the Bobbies to act accordingly54. While London Bobbies were certainly
responsible for much violence throughout the 19th century55, it remains an open
question whether English constables operated with greater moderation compared to
their European or American counterparts56. Judging from the few cases which
appeared before the Old Bailey, the levels of alleged violence inflicted by accused
constables – although considerable – were not as extreme as the cases appearing in
the German Landgerichte. The police attack on George Hillmann in 1897 or the case
against PC Ashford for assaulting George Gamble in 1907 were probably some of
the more serious cases brought before a London court57.
Contemporary observers familiar with French or Prussian policing accepted the
claim of English police moderation as perfectly plausible. Similarly police
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apologists described the low number of cases against policemen as evidence of
generally good discipline58. Yet the low number of cases is at odds with frequent
allegation in the popular press of serious police malpractice. Rather than being a tes-
timony to the good behaviour of Bobbies, the low number of prosecutions against
constables at the Old Bailey may simply reflect the difficulties of prosecuting59.
Policemen’s actions were difficult to prove beyond reasonable doubt, and even
where independent witnesses came forward their evidence tended to carry less
weight than the statements by policemen. Moreover police colleagues would
normally support the version of events provided by the accused constables60.
This study has identified twenty-three cases between 1871 and 1913 where con-
stables were prosecuted before the Old Bailey. Twelve cases of police perjury over
the entire period is remarkably few given the frequent allegations of systematic
police perjury from the press, from critics and even from the magistrate Hugh
Gamon, who very candidly describes widespread police perjury committed at
magistrates’ courts61. Only seven cases were found concerning assault or wounding
and four cases where constables were prosecuted for serious crime unrelated to their
professional activities (murder, arson, robbery and mail theft).
The twenty-three cases led to eleven convictions (48 percent), but the conviction
rate varied considerably depending on the charge. The four cases where the crimes
were unrelated to professional duties all led to conviction. In perjury cases the con-
viction rate (42 percent) was considerably higher than for cases concerning assault
and wounding (28.5 percent). Moreover the only two cases of assault that led to con-
viction date from 1908 and 191362, while all cases from before 1908 led to acquittal.
This may reflect a stricter approach to police violence in general or simply short-
term effects after the Royal Commission of 1906-1908.
It was the magistrates’ courts that dealt with the majority of prosecutions against
policemen, even though many of these cases should rightly have been brought
before the Old Bailey63. Comprehensive numbers of cases against police constables
are hard to come by. According to figures provided by the Metropolitan police there
were for the year 1906 a total of four court cases against police constables, all con-
cerning assault, illegal arrest or perjury. All four cases were heard before a
magistrates court, all led to acquittal, and none were appealed to a higher court64. As
many magistrates were suspicious and unsympathetic to complaints against the
police, the aggrieved citizens could not be sure to get a fair hearing at the magis-
trates’ courts65. Yet the magistrates’ courts were much cheaper for the complainant
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than criminal prosecution at the Old Bailey, and aggrieved citizens were more likely
to obtain conviction by pushing for a lesser charge66. While not entirely even-
handed, the magistrates’ courts provided people who had limited means with an
affordable way to have their cases tried and perhaps to get some redress. This
created some sense of justice and due process, as well as the satisfaction of having
the evidence heard and publicly recognised.
In German debates the perceived inadequacies of courts in handling cases of vio-
lent policemen were right at the heart of public criticism over limited police
accountability. Although the main criticism came from the SPD and the Liberal
press, serious concerns were also voiced in the press that generally favoured law and
order67. The pattern of prosecutions differed from the Old Bailey in three important
ways. With 556 criminal cases against Berlin Schutzmänner brought before the
Prussian Landgerichte between 1899 and 190568, the number of prosecutions was
much higher than at the Old Bailey. These figures do not include civil suits for libel
or compensation, which would bring the figures from an annual average of 81 to
130-14069. Secondly, the vast majority of cases before Prussian Landgerichte con-
cerned extreme violence leading to serious injury or death (Körperverletzung, Mis-
shandlung, Totschlag). Thirdly, with a conviction rate at 72 percent (400 out of 556
cases), the Prussian Landgerichte were far more likely to deliver a guilty verdict
than the Old Bailey.
The higher conviction rates at Prussian courts reflect the particular workings of
the Prussian judicial system. Private prosecution for criminal offenses was not an
option as this was the preserve of the public prosecutor, who assessed all the evi-
dence and only allowed a case to proceed if he was satisfied that there was a rea-
sonable chance that the case might lead to conviction. Most allegations of police
violence could not be prosecuted because the Schutzmann, although acting with
extreme violence, had not been in breach of his legal entitlement. As the German
Criminal Code of 1872 did not operate with the concept of proportionality in
policing, the Schutzmann could not be prosecuted for excessive violence if the
violence was inflicted with the intention of enforcing the law. Only violence without
any clear law-enforcement objective could be considered a breach of the Schutz-
mann’s legal entitlement.
While the high conviction rate was rarely commented on in the press, what par-
ticularly caught the attention of the wider public were the many cases that were suf-
ficiently well documented to be heard in court, but still led to acquittal. In addition
there were numerous cases reported in the press of extreme police violence resulting
in loss of limb or permanent disability, but which did not constitute a breach of the
Schutzmann’s legal powers. This did nothing to raise public confidence in the abil-
ity of the courts to punish Schutzmänner for committing acts of extreme violence.
Instead the legal system as it functioned only exacerbated the impression that
Schutzmänner were to a great extent beyond the reach of the law.
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The ’sense of justice’ (Rechstbewusstsein) of many Germans was further
offended by what both contemporary critics and historians have described – with
varying degrees of moral indignation – as extremely lenient punishments70. Between
1898 and 1905, 52 percent of the 400 convicted Schutzmänner received only a fine
and another 15 percent got less than three months imprisonment, while 21 percent
got between three and six months. Seven percent got between six month and one
year, while three percent got one year and above71. This was not entirely out of line
with the punishments given by the Old Bailey in the two cases that led to conviction:
out of four London constables convicted of wounding or assault, one got four
months hard labour, one got nine, while the remaining two got twelve months each72.
Yet, while the German public was outraged over such sentences, in London only the
usual critics raised concern.
Some additional factors made the punishment of Schutzmänner all the more
intolerable. Firstly, the vast majority of convicted Schutzmänner applied to the Jus-
tice Ministry for mercy (Gnade) leading to a significant number getting some reduc-
tion in their sentence73. In addition, while a conviction of a London Bobby would
automatically lead to the dismissal from the force, there was nothing to prevent a
Schutzmann from returning to his post once he had expunged his sentence. Indeed
reinstatement was the norm and some Schutzmänner had several convictions to their
name.
The German public also compared the sentencing of Schutzmänner convicted of
extreme violence, manslaughter or perjury with the harsh punishments handed down
to those numerous Germans who were brought before the civil courts for libel against
the police. German libel laws were very loosely defined, and used by Germans of all
creeds and casts74. During the 1890s the libel laws became the main weapon by the
authorities against their critics75. Newspaper editors, notably of the liberal and social
democratic press, were in and out of prison, with sentences easily ranging from three
to six months76. The systematic prosecution for libel may have stifled criticism in the
short term, but it also perpetuated an image in the wider public of the Schutz-
mannschaft being unreasonable, unaccountable, and petty in its revengefulness.
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The inconsistent rhetoric, the clumsy handling of complaints and the inability of
the courts to hold policemen properly to account undermined any attempt by the
police to improve relationships with the public. Instead the Schutzmannschaft was
met with suspicion and fear. The insistence of police managers on the honesty and
integrity of the Schutzmannschaft also left the force extremely vulnerable to ridicule
and contempt when embarrassing revelations were made to the contrary.
PUBLIC RECEPTION:
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCANDAL AND WINNING
THE MORAL ARGUMENT
In London as in Berlin, the actions of the police, individually and collectively,
were subjected to constant scrutiny by the public. In both countries popular news-
papers, left-liberal police critics and the left-wing opposition all sought to mobilise
public outrage over “scandalous” police behaviour. For the expanding popular
press, reports of “police behaving badly” constituted excellent news material ; for
left-liberal police critics it provided a platform to push for judicial and administra-
tive reforms; and for the socialist or social democratic opposition it provided ammu-
nition to undermine the legitimacy of the police, attack the political elites and ulti-
mately the regime.
Scandals could be constructed not only around policemen committing acts that
were criminal in the eyes of the law, but also around non-criminal police behaviour
that transgressed popular conceptions of acceptable policing. Critics could construct
a “scandal” at two levels, most obviously about police acts considered unacceptable
by a public increasingly sensitive to police violence and illegality. However, just as
often the main “scandal,” as presented by the press, was about the handling of police
misbehaviour more than the transgressive act itself.
The potential for the critical press to turn some event involving the Schutz-
mannschaft into a “scandal” by mobilising public outrage was far greater in Berlin
than it was in London. During the Wilhelmine era with the more liberal enforcement
of the German press laws, the public media were full of spicy revelations detailing
the less than edifying conduct of public authorities and social elites77. The outrage
against policing was not restricted to the SPD press, as the call for Schutz gegen
Schutzleute became a rallying cry among a broad spectrum of the press, occasion-
ally including even the conservative press78. Among many middle-class Berliners
there had undoubtedly been a good measure of complacency when it came to police
violence against drunken workers, disorderly individuals from the lower orders,
criminals and prostitutes. By the 1890s, however, even conservatively-minded
members of the civil service recognised that police malpractice was counterproduc-
tive, not least in that it boosted the ranks of the Social Democratic Party. Moreover,
middle-class citizens increasingly found themselves at the wrong end of the police
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truncheon and treated the same way as members of the lower orders by assertive
Schutzmänner bossing around the Berlin public with little regard for social distinc-
tion.
As a result of the jingoistic declarations frequently employed in police state-
ments, and the readiness of government authorities to justify extreme policing, the
German public was ready to believe the Schutzmannschaft capable of any level of
violence and violation of citizens’ rights79. So police authorities enjoyed very little
credibility even among core supporters of law and order when refuting allegations
of malpractice, even in cases where police were in fact not at fault. The Social
Democratic press in particular employed negative popular expectations to under-
mine the legitimacy of the Schutzmannschaft. Revelations of “scandalous” police
behaviour and inadequate responses from the authorities became part of the Social
Democratic weaponry against the political regime and social order, illustrating by
outrageous examples the moral corruption of the social and political elites as well as
the rottenness of the wider system. The more extreme the case, the more eager the
Social Democrats would be to publicise it. Critics of the Social Democrats were not
entirely unjustified in dismissing some of the reporting as exaggerated sensationalist
propaganda.
However, Social Democratic reporting was often supported by hard facts that
were difficult to refute. In many cases there was no need to adopt a polemical tone
of moral outrage in order to create the effect. Often it sufficed to publicise the facts,
eyewitness accounts, together with official statements from the Berlin Polizei-
präsident and the Interior Minister. The official justifications tended to be self-
incriminating by their outrageous crassness and fanciful explanations of how people
lost limbs in encounters with the heavily armed Schutzmannschaft, versions of
events that flew in the face of common-sense.
While the authorities appeared extreme in their defence of the indefensible, the
journalists could style themselves as the voices of reason and moderation. The criti-
cal press also published leaked documents from the Interior Ministry showing that
government authorities were trying to address the problem of police violence. Had
these documents been publicised by the Ministry they would have proved the good
will of the Ministry. In the hands of hostile journalists, this was lost in the triumphant
demonstration that the Ministry internally recognised that the police were guilty of
extreme acts of violence and illegality80. Even when seeking to improve bad practices
and poor police behaviour, the Berlin Schutzmannschaft lost the moral high-ground.
Although the SPD was far more marginalised and vilified by political opponents
than Socialists and Left-Liberals in Britain, their campaigns of naming and shaming
were considerably more effective in gripping the attention of the German public
well beyond their own supporters. Repeated scandals reaching into the highest
echelons of government and high-society involving elements from within the police
projected a very poor impression of bribery, corruption and illegal practices within
the political police and the criminal investigation department.
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It was far more difficult for aggrieved Londoners and their supporters to raise the
temperature among the public to the level of moral outrage over police behaviour.
This was despite much reporting in the British popular press of numerous cases of
police violence and leniency in magistrates courts against violent policemen81. The
English popular press used some of the same techniques as those deployed by the
German popular press seeking to manufacture scandals for political or business pur-
poses through sustained campaigns with embarrassing revelations. However, those
who criticised the London Met rarely managed to gain the moral upper-hand to an
extent comparable with that achieved by the press in Germany.
British policing was therefore much less vulnerable to “scandals” than the Berlin
Schutzmannschaft 82. In London, police managers were capable of diffusing much of
the public consternation over police malpractice by the skilful handling of allega-
tions complaints. The claim of honest and good police behaviour was credible to
most middle-class Londoners who had never witnessed incidents of violent policing,
as heavy-handed police interventions in London were socially discretionary83, and
mostly happened out of the sight of respectable middle-class citizens, late at night or
in poor areas of the city. As the ‘respectable’ public rarely had any dealings with the
police and rarely or never witnessed the uglier aspects of policing in working class
areas84, they were willing to give the police the benefit of the doubt when presented
with conflicting versions of events. It is also striking how willing the London public
was to accept the police managers’ rhetorical strategy of presenting criticisms and
allegations against the police as verging on the morally unacceptable.
Accounts from police magistrates are often apologetic about police malpractice.
Only Gamon is unusually candid in admitting that policemen operated in highly
questionable fashions in London’s East End and that police perjury in magistrates’
courts was frequent but very rarely prosecuted85. No such admissions were made in
The Times which only reported the most high-profile cases of police malpractice,
but often represented with consternation the possibility that anyone could suggest
that London Bobbies were anything but honest and upright. Where allegations of
malpractice could be substantiated, this was treated as an isolated case of a ‘bad
apples’ that did not reflect on the wider system86. By contrast, The Times provided
extensive coverage of police scandals abroad, thus strengthening the impression
among The Times readers of the comparative superiority of British police forces.
In times of major revelations of malpractice the temperature of public indigna-
tion rose a couple of degrees at best, and soon abated. Accordingly there was less
scope for using attacks on the police as a means of furthering wider political agen-
das, much to the frustration, no doubt, of the left-wing opposition. Even the repeated
clashes between police and unemployed workers in 1886-1887 that culminated in
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81 Among London based newspapers the Pall Mall Gazette, Reynold’s Newspaper and Lloyd’s Weekly
systematically reported on police malpractice.
82 Searle makes a similar point comparing the impact of scandals on British governments 1890-1930 to
their French Republican counterparts. Searle (1987, p. 423).
83 On social discretions in the practices of the London Met, see Gamon (1907, p. 26); Shpayer-Makov
(2002, p. 148).
84 Gamon (1907, pp. 21-22).
85 Gamon (1907, pp. 21-24 & 134-137); Waddy (1925, pp. 51-52); Cairn (1922, pp. 263-269).
86 See articles on the Metropolitan Police published in The Times from December 1908 to January 1909,
notably 25 December 1908, ‘The Metropolitan Police: From a Correspondent’: 2. ‘The Constable.’
the Trafalgar Square Riots, although generating criticism from a broad political
spectrum including Liberals and Left-Liberals as well as various Radical and Socialist
factions, was only used by the left wing of the Labour movement to target the
regime. Following the Trafalgar Square riots of November 1887, William Stead and
Annie Besant set up the ‘Law and Liberty League’ to support workers who had been
arrested or suffered injury during encounters with the police. Initially the organisa-
tion enjoyed broad support among Left-Liberals and socialists. Yet interest soon
waned. During 1888 Besant used the LLL publication The Link in very similar ways
to those of the SPD press by printing allegations against the police. However her
attempt to give publicity to people who believed that their rights and personal
integrity had been violated was severely criticised even by close friends for printing
unsubstantiated claims87. Even left-wing critics of the London Met were ready to
consider the possibility that not all claims might be genuine, and maintained that
allegations needed to go through proper complaints procedures or the courts before
they could be recognised as ‘true.’ This shows a remarkable acceptance even among
critics for the complaints and accountability procedures, even if these were far from
perfect.
The London Metropolitan police, for their part, sought to individualise and mar-
ginalize critics, and present them as a small minority of criminals, political extrem-
ists, or malicious madmen88. This is well illustrated by the experiences of the cam-
paigner James Timewell. In 1897, when witnessing the heavy-handed arrest of a
young man in Southwark, Timewell was shocked. His initial disbelief indicates how
surprising it was for a middle-class man, even a politically active person, to imagine
the London Bobby being callously violent. Believing that this was an aberration
from usual policing practices by a few rogue elements, he reported the incident to
the magistrates’ court. What he experienced at the magistrates’ court and later at the
Old Bailey was indifference to his complaint by the magistrate and outright lies
from the police89. Yet his attempts to mobilise public opinion and raise awareness of
police malpractice faltered in the face of a public unwilling to believe that policing
of poorer areas of London was characterised by violence and arbitrary arrests. As his
campaigns persisted with the organisation of the ’Police and Public Vigilance Society’
in 1902 and his activities during the Royal Commission of 1906-1908, he was
described in the media and by prosecutors at the Old Bailey variously as a madman
or as a malicious busybody with bad intentions ranging from stirring up social dis-
order among the poor to insinuation of paedophilia90. Moreover like other critical
witnesses appearing at the Royal Commission, Timewell was subjected to two years
of systematic character assassination by the police’s defence team.
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88 This was the fate of William Caine and Bradford Woodgate in 1887 (NA, HO144/472/X15239A and
NA, HO144/472/X15239A). The campaigner James Timewell was subjected to similar character
assassination after the end of the Royal Commission in 1908. See also The Times, ‘Editorial : The
Metropolitan Police’, 24 December 1908.
89 Oldbaileyonline: R. vs. John Ferris, Frederick Corps, Richard Sands, Charles Woodridge for assault
on George Hillman, 10 January 1898. Timewell (1898, pp. 3-4 & 9-10).
90 Oldbaileyonline: R. vs. James Adams, 19 November 1907, a case in which Timewell was involved
in establishing evidence against PC Adams. Similarly R. vs. Ernest Sexton, William Church and
Beatrice Church, 3 March 1908; R. vs. Walter Studds, 12 October 1909.
The fate of people who complained against the London Metropolitan was all too
often “double victimisation”. The honourable principle that the police were inno-
cent until proven guilty meant that people who claimed to be victimised were suspi-
cious and probably motivated by personal grudges, greed, extremism or madness.
This would be the line of the police and their defence lawyers, as well as sections of
the press that was sympathetic to the police. In Berlin everybody was willing to
believe any claim of police violence as true. In London, the explanations given by
the police and government authorities were sufficiently plausible for important parts
of the London public to give the police the benefit of the doubt.
CONCLUSIONS
The comparison of police-public relations in London and Berlin between the
1880s and 1914 illustrates how the responses by police and government authorities
to legitimate public concerns over police malpractice shaped public perceptions of
police malpractice as a widespread or a marginal phenomenon. Both forces were
accused by their critics of undue violence against members of the public, of illegal
practices and perjury, and occasionally of corruption. In both capitals, critics argued
that complaints systems and criminal procedures were heavily biased against the
aggrieved citizen. Yet the potential for critical voices to generate public consterna-
tion over police malpractice, and for the press to construct a “scandal” on the basis
of individual incidents of malpractice, was much greater in Berlin than in London.
In London there were plenty of allegations in the press of police malpractice.
Yet, apart from the mid-1880s and the years up to and during the Royal Commission
of 1906-1908, incidents rarely developed into “scandal”. The skilful handling of
complaints and allegations by the London Metropolitan police, and the successful
projection of the Metropolitan police authorities as responsive and sensitive to
citizens’ legitimate concerns, repeatedly helped to maintain and restore widespread
public trust in the police. The claim that the Metropolitan police was transparent,
accountable and responsive was sufficiently credible to large sections of respectable
citizens to trust the police accounts and give them the benefit of the doubt. More-
over, the occasional incidents of exemplary punishment of erring Bobbies were pre-
sented to the public as evidence of the effectiveness and robustness of control and
accountability mechanisms. This paradoxically helped to strengthen public trust and
police legitimacy, while complainants and critics were vilified and marginalised in
the public debate. Despite much concern in the popular press about police violence,
perjury and corruption, the Metropolitan police tended to win the moral argument.
In Berlin it was the critical voices that came to shape mainstream popular
assumptions about how the Schutzmannschaft operated as standard practice. Senior
managers did make serious efforts to improve public relations and did pursue and
discipline erring Schutzmänner; yet such initiatives were continuously undermined
by inappropriate, insensitive and highly unsatisfactory responses to legitimate
public concerns about serious malpractice among Berlin Schutzmänner. Similarly
the courts failed to convincingly play the role as effective defenders of citizens’
rights and upholders of police discipline. Rather than reassuring the public, the
controlling authorities further exacerbated the impression that the Schutzmänner,
collectively and individually, operated outside the law almost with impunity. As the
authorities repeatedly lost the competition for the moral high-ground in the eyes of
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the majority of Berliners, even among natural supporters of law and order, this seri-
ously harmed the legitimacy of policing.
This made the Schutzmannschaft far more vulnerable than the London Metro-
politan police for political opponents or the press to use incidents of police mal-
practice for their own political or commercial ends. In London, although trust in the
Metropolitan police was harmed during the First World War and interwar period, the
positive image of the Metropolitan police – and British policing generally –
persisted throughout most of the 20th century. German police, by contrast, continued
to struggle during the Weimar era with deep-seated public suspicion and with
expectation of police brutality and illegality beyond the reach of the law. This was
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